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HEART AND SOUL IN ARISTOTLE

Theodore Tracy,

S.J.

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Under this rather sentimental sounding title I should like to recall a
critical problem in Aristotle's psychology, trace briefly some of the discussion
of that problem, and suggest a few considerations which, if not entirely original,
The
may at least advance the discussion along lines already suggested by others.

problem is,
ago

of course,

that which Francois Nuyens raised over twenty five years

(L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote,

Louvain,

Aristotle's famous definition of the soul in De Anima
lument incompatible"

(p. 165) with the notionof the soulpresent "in the heart"

and operating principally through the heart,
of the Parva Naturalia

compatibility,

1948) when he declared

(=DA)* 412b5-6 to be "abso

a notion he finds prominent in some

(=PN) and the majority of the biological works.

assumed throughout Nuyens' study

(45,

47,

55-58,

119,

This in

159-171,

etc.),

served as his chief criterion for dividing Aristotle's works chronologically into

those of an earlier "transitional period" and those of the "terminal period" of

hylomorphism.
Nuyens'

use of a single criterion for distributing the works chronologically

promised an advantage over the procedure of Jaeger,
internal criteria established for each treatise.

accepted substantially by some very great scholars,
and Sir David Ross, along with Drossaart Lulofs,
D.

A.

Rees, and others

of Aristotle," CW 60,

(see w.
1967,

published in Pauly,-Wissowa

who dependeci upon particular

Nuyens'

work was acclaimed and

notably by Augustin Mansion

Pierre Louis, Barbotin,

Gauthier,

Fortenbaugh,

318-20).

(Suppl.

XI,

"Recent Scholarship in the Psychology
Ingemar o\iring, in his article on Aristotle
253-54) in 1968,

expressed the judgment

that Nuyens' position at that time could "als die herrschende Meinung betrachtet

werden."

Yet even while Dllring1s article was being written,

critiques of Nuyens' view,

especially as adopted by Ross,

the most searching

were already in print.

Objections to details of Nuyens' work had been raised,

of course,

from the

But the first serious challenge to the validity of his
main criterion seems to have been published by Irving Block in his paper on "The
Block
Order of Aristotle's Psychological Writings" in 1961 (AJP 82, 50-77).
time of its publication.

argued first that A.'s definition of soul as form or entelechy of the body does
not logically forbid him to emphasize a particular organ as source of the acti
vities whereby the body lives.

Secondly,

Block analyzed the passages from the

(=DSen) cited by Ross as illustrating a "two substance theory of body and
soul" and provided alternative interpretations and arguments to show that these

�

Sensu

statements could be reconciled with the hylomorphic view of soul.

Thirdly,

Block here first called attention in print to the important passage in Metaphysics
(=M) Zeta (1035bl4 ff.) where A. speaks clearly of the soul as "form and essence
of-the body" and at the same time refers to it as being present primarily in a

dominant organ of the body,

thereby indicating that these notions,

absolutely

Block's effort in this
part of his paper was largely negative, countering the arguments of Ross espe
cially, yet providing solid evidence that the "entelechy view" and the "heart
view" were not incompatible in A.'s mind.
Two years later Marjorie Grene's
incompatible for Nuyens, apparently were not so for A.

�

Portrait_E..f Aristotle appeared

(Chicago,

1963),

presenting further evidence

*The following symbols will be used in referring to the works of. Aristotle (=A.):
DGA=De Gen. Animalium; DJuv=De Juventute; DMA=De Motu Animalium; �De
su; DSom=De Somno;
Res ratione;
Animalium; DSen=De
em=D
r
oria; DPA=D
ns.
editio
his
to
refer
ss DA and PN
va Natural
M=Metaphysica; PN=P
DA=De Anima;

P'i

OO

�
�

;-Pa° t.
��

�

' ' ',

-���·_: - : ': ,·:-· -

-: _, _-.

�i�y�ns

n

(p. 3 5} that both the hylomorphic soul and
J:i&ctrine of the heart as source of life are found side by s id e in the De
'G�rleratione An ima l ium (=DG�), a work wh i c h Nuyens dates with 01\. i.n the latest
period of A.

's

•

view by po inti g out

development.

passage from M Zeta were both incorporated
the Re l at i o n Between
in w. F. R.
14, 53-72)
(Philosophical
Quarterly
1964
n
i
the Soul and the Bo d y , " published
H
a
r
d
ie
uses
the.in
effectively
against
two
but written some years earlier.
propositions a ss umed by Nuyens , nainely,
{l) that A. k new or bel i ev ed there was
a contradiction between.the " ent el e c h y view" and the "heart view" of the
soul,
and (2) that he gave up the latter after developing the former.
In support of
his position Hardie also pres e t s a l o ng analysis of the passage in De Motu
Animalium {=DMA}on the orig in of moveme nt in animals (699al4-b7, 702a21-bll),
s ho w ing it cons i s te n t with the crypt ic description of the same in DA III, 4 33 b2 1 -2 9 ,
a co nsi sten cy acknowledged by Ross in his commen tar y on DA (p. 317}:°"
Hardie
finds evidence of t he hylomorphic view, too, in Q� I, DSen, and De Memoria (=DMem),
all regarded by Ross as written befo r e A. adopted the entelechy view.
Thus Hardie
succeeds in establishing t hat "Aristotle finds no inconsis tency between t he hylo
mo rp hic doctrine and loc al izat ion in the heart" (p. 67) and in detec t in g incon
This evidence from DGA and
Hardie's ar ti c le on

the

"Aristotle's Treatment of

n

sistencies in t he position of Nuyens and

Ross.

However, his attempt to go beyond

to show that th e two doctrines co mplement each other

this,

(p.

67 ff.),

is

,

I believe, only partially s ucc ess fu l .
While

Nuyens' position,

in Dur i ng' s j ud gment ,

could be con s ider ed the pr e



vail ing view in 1968, these c r it ique s wer e hav ing their effect.
That same year
saw the appea rance of G. E. R. Lloyd's Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His
{ Cambr idge ,

Thought

" ent e lec hy

Engl.)

v iew " vs.

Hardie have s ho wn

•

•

.

the

in

which Lloyd re.marks of Nuyens'

"heart view"

(p.

25): "

•

•

.

pos it ion on the

sc ho l ar s such as Block and

that whatever we may think of the re l a t ion ship between the

in ques tion , Aristotle himself was unaware of any i ncompatibi l ity
between them."
Two years la ter , in 1970, R.-A. Gauthier pub li shed the revision
of his introdu c tion to Ar isto te : L' th ique
N ic omaque (2nd ed., I, 1, I..ouvain),
ret a ining Nuy en s ' c hrono logy and dea l ing brie f ly with these cri tiques (46-47,
n. 113).
His effe c tivenes s , and theirs, is evaluated thus by Jon at han Barnes in
his review in AGP 55, 1973, 80: "The distinction between Instrumentism and Hyle
morphism, which forms the cor e of Nuyens' po sit io n, has been demolished by
Block
and by Ha rdi e
Gau th ie r discusses Block's and Hardie's criticisms
two doctrines

E

•

•

.

•

•

•

�

.

•

but fails to appreciate their direction and their fo rce .

n

n

If we accept Barn es ' opi ion that the core of N uy e s

demolished by Block and by Harcfre,"
discussions se ttled the problem,

not.

'

Ross

•

position "has been

what more r ema ins to be done?

Have their

lea v ing room for no thing but autopsy?

These studies have presented compelling evidence that the

and t he
by

•

"

Perhaps

"e ntelech y view"

"heart view" of the soul, though regarded as inc ompatible by Nuyens and
(see his PN, 7-12), apparently present ed no in compat i bili ty to A.'s mind

since they appear"""to geth er in the same context and the same works.
of course,

to

demo l ish

the core of Nuyens'

This

is

en o ug h,

pos it ion and the basis for his chrono

logical d istr ibu tion of A. 's wr it ings .
But it leaves us with the pro b l em which
troubled Nuyens in the first place, to whic h he offered his d eve lopment a l or

chronological solution.
There does seem to be something in co mpati ble be tween
the notion o f the soul as entelechy of the whole body (so that every organ, to
be alive, must be " ens oul ed " ) and statements that the soul is "in the heart"
(e.g., De Juventute=DJuv 469a5-7) and that " ther e is no need of soul in each part"
�

��
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as long as it
did

If A.

"is present in some ruling center of the body"

(DMA 703a36-37).

not regard these as incompatible, how would he reconcile them?

relationship would he see between them?

What

How are they compatible in his terms?

Block has argued that the notion of the soul present in the whole body is

logically compatible with the notion of the soul centered in one part, using as
illustration the light in an electric bulb and in its filament (52-53).
Hardie

deals helpfully with the passage from DMA 702a21 ff.

troublesome statement just quoted

press it too hard

(p.

60).

(703a36-37)

but backs away from the

with the warning that we should not

Brief but valuable suggestions on how A.

might relate

the two doctrines appear in Paul Siwek's introduction to his De Anima (Rome, 1965,
18-19) and in H. J. Easterling's "Note on de Anima 413a8-9" (Phronesis 11, 1966,
161-62).

But of those I know,

the longest and most helpful contribution in this

direction is Charles Kahn's study of "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's

Psychology" published in AGP

(48. 1,

43-81)

in 1966.

Kahn's study is concerned specifically with the relationship of the psychic

to the physical aspects of sensation in Aristotle and in contemporary psychology.

The greater part of the study

(46-70),

sense psychology in his terms,

devoted to a comprehensive review of A.'s

establishes that A.'s "sensory soul" comprises a

single psychological system in which the functions of the special senses are inte
grated by the sensus communis,

ducing sense of time,

in A.'s terms, must inform,
organic system which,

identical under other aspects with the faculty pro

images,

memories,

sleep and dreams.

But the "sensory soul",

and function physiologically through,

for A.,

an appropriate

can only be the organs of the special senses in con

nection with the organ of the sensus communis,

the heart.

Reflecting on the impli

cations of A.'s description of the "sensory soul" and its functions as presented in
DA,

Kahn shows that they require the physiological system eventually presented in

the PN,

so that the discussion of sensation and the "sensory soul" begun in the DA

is continued,

and not contradicted,

by that of the PN

(67-68).

Why,

then,

sensus communis treated so sketchily and the heart hardly mentioned in DA?
maintains

(vs.

Block II)

that the reason is methodological,

is the
Kahn

not chronological.

The De Anima takes up a somewhat different point of view,
stracts from all consideration of physiological detail.

since it ab
But there is

really no reason to suppose that the physiological model.in Aristotle's
mind,

which he systematically refrains from introducing into the

�

Anima, is in any way different from that which is actually expounded
by him in the other works
Kahn's study,

I believe,

lem raised by Nuyens.

'

(68-69).

represents a long step toward a solution of the prob

Following his lead,

of the considerations proposed there,

I shall atte.mpt to develop further some

and shall assume as valid his demonstration

that A.'s discussion of the "sensory soul" and its organs in the PN is continuous,
progressive,
in DA.

and in essential agreement with the doctrine proposed in general terms

Any errors or imperfections in the attempt,

of course,

will be my own.

The Heart in the De Anima
First of all�

to confirm and go beyond the position modestly stated in Kahn's

last sentence quoted above,

I suggest that we find very good reason indeed to believe

the physiological model in A.'s mind in DA is substantially the same as that actually
expounded by him in the PN and other works if we examine carefully the references to
the heart in DA,

few and'°""Incidental though they be,

ciples and r emarks appearing in that same work.

in conjunction with other prin

Elsewhere Kahn has suggested that

4

"these passages are revealing enough

.

•

•

the heart in need of breath and the rational

or sensitive

soul operating in the chest can hardly reflect anything but Aristotle's

own biology"

(64-65,

in
a

n.

50).

This seems important enough to elaborate,

especially

ew of the fact that Ross considered A. 's relat ive silence on the heart in DA
s ign that he had abandoned the psychophys iology of the biological works (PN, 7-8, 12).
vi

Distinguishing it from the hylomorphism of DA,
the biological works as follows

Ross characterizes the view of

phase

(PN 6):

"In thi s

of Aristotle's thought, soul
is thought of as cl o s ely associated with heat, and with the hottest organ in the

body,

Ross then cites as typical of the "heart view" selections from

the heart."

the De Partibus Animalium

(=DPA) where A.

asserts that the soul,

while itself not

fire, uses heat as a most apt instrument in its operations , specifically nutrition
an d the imparting of motion (652b7-16); that the heart is the center of life and of
vital heat (653b5-6), the source of motion and sensation (665al0-13) essential to
all animals

{678bl-4).

However,

I believe it can be shown that these same functions

are attributed to vital heat and to the heart in the DA also,

where the

"entelechy

view" is proposed in detail .
Turning then to DA,

Y" :

writings on psycholog

Book II
Ross,

("

•

.

•

in all probability the latest of Aristotle's

PN 17),

we might consider first the passage where A.

denies that "the nature of fi re-;;-is the cause,
and growth,

but asserts that:

cause absolutely;

"A co-cause,

that is rather the soul"

(416b20 ff.) that in nutrition

plains

"nutritive soul" tha t nourishes,
be understood to include
out changing another,
concoction

(i.e.,

it certainly is;

(416al3-15).

(a) the food,

Ex_

which must be concocted

like a ship's rudder) and

the

(i.e.

changed with

(b) the vital heat, which effects

is moved by the soul and itself changes the food,

like the helms

like the helmsman,

see Hicks 348-49).

Clearly,

then,

effects

in DA as in

-;-using

the soul is closely associated with the vital heat

as co-cause or primary instrument to effect nutrition and growth.
passage

(2)

which the body is nourished must

man's hand on the r udder , - - implying that the soul1

the biological works,

but not the

Shortly thereafter he ex

(1) it is the body that is nourished,

(3) while that

change while remaining unchanged:

of nutrition

without qu alif ica tion ,

in a sense,

it

And the same

(416b9 ff.) explains how indispensible an instrument heat is to soul;

for

that which is ensouled or alive is said to preserve its substance only as long as
it is nourished

(416bl4-1

5},

but

what produces digestion is heat;
heat"

"all nourishment must be able to be digested;

and

therefore everything that is ensouled possesses

(416b28-29).
This principle must apply not only to the organism as a whole but to each part

of the organism,

since all living parts need nourishment.

However,

A.

indicates

also in DA II that he is not thinking of all parts of the animal body as possessing

heat in equal degree,
i.e.,

but rather that the heart is "the hottest organ of the body,"

the center of vital heat,

as in the biological works.

heat of the body

(420b20-21),

A.

ment ions,

while

For in DA II,

g-the

explaining that nature uses breath as a necessary means of regulatin

incidentally but explicitly,

internal

that the

area which needs cooling before all others is the one surrounding the heart
25-26).

(420b

T his is perfectly consistent with his detailed description of heat distri

bution in the body at DJuv 469b6 ff.:

"Now in animals all the parts and the body

as a whole contain a certain natural innate heat
blooded animals must be in the heart
Ross himself,

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

And the source of this heat in

"

in his commentary on DA 416b25-29 and 420b21 ff.

(231-32,

252),

refers to this and other passages from the l ast two treatises of the PN for A.'s

full expl anation of the physiological functions of the vital heat centered in the
heart.
It appears, then, that even in DA II, where he sets out the "entelechy view"

5

of the soul, A.

is also thinking of it as "closely associated with heat, and with

the hottest organ of the body,

the heart."

The passages from DPA which Ross cites as typical of A.'s thinking in the bio
logical works indicate a further close connection between the heart as center of
In his 1957 edition
vital heat and as source of sensation and movement in animals.
of � Ross states simply (p. 12) : "In the De Anima no such significance is attri
buted to the heart
"
This judgment is qualified, however, in his 1961 edition of
•

DA

•

•

10): "In contrast with the importance attached to the heart in the biological

(p.

works and the Parva Naturalia, in none of the four passages in which the heart is
mentioned in the De Anima is any primary importance attached to it,
31, 408b8,

although in 4 03a

and 432b31 it is still treated as the seat of anger and fear."

It is t:i:ue that in these passages in DA the heart is "mentioned only incident

ally and in other connections," as Ross r emarks elsewhere

But this does

(PN 12).

not necessarily mean that in none of them "is any primary importance attached to it"
(DA 10).

imply,

The incidental references may be more revealing for what they assume or

as in the case of the first at 420b25-26 indicating the heart as center of

the vital heat necessary to the basic functions of nutrition and growth.

In the

other three references mentioned by Ross we find the heart invariably singled out
as the specific organ in which psychic states are immediately manifested in the
body.

When considering these one should bear in mind a principle upon which A.

sists in the DA,

namely,

even the lowest, implies the coexistence of others in the same part:
sense perception, there is also imagination and appetite;
tion exists there is also pleasure and pain,
exists"

(413b22-24;

in

that the existence of one sense power in part of an animal,

and see 414bl-6).

"If there is

for where sense percep

and where these,

"Speaking generally,

desire necessarily

then,

in as much as an

animal is capable of appetite it is also capable of self-movement;

but it is not

capable of appetite without imagination, and all imagination involves either calcu
lation or sensation"
stated in De Somno

(433b27-29; and see 433b31-434a7).

The same principle is re

which goes on to attribute these conscious

(=DSom) 454b29-31,

activities"i:o the central sense faculty whose organ is the heart.

Of the three mentioned by Ross we might consider first the reference at 408b8,
which occurs in a context recognized by Nuyens as hylemorphique
here

(186).

(408bl-19) is emphasizing the bodily aspect of psychic states,

which,

he says,

pleased,

Ar is totle

the aspect

is often overlooked when we speak of the soul as being pained,

bold, fearful,

etc.

Each of these states is a movement

matter) having its origin in the soul.
for the heart to be changed

"For example,

to be angry or to fear is

(moved) in this way or that,

vo&1o0a.1. ) involves this organ or some other"
changed in a similar way or some other":

Ox.

(408b7-9;
transl.;

(which implies

and to reason
or

Hicks 274 ad b9).

and manner of the change in the heart is not specified.

( 51.a•

"that the heart be
The nature

Thus far-408bl-ll.

The

A. continues, that to say the soul is moved or changed, e.g., feels
is like saying it weaves or buildS:--It is better not to speak of the soul
as feeling angry but rather to say that the composite, the man, does so, under

point is,
anger,

standing �hat- the. ·change: involved·'in sensation and' emotion do�-�
but reaches to the soul or starts from it (bll-18).

not_.:occur

iri

the

soul

The latter part of this passage

(bll-18) is employed some seventeen times by
But he never
and properly so.

Nuyens as illustrative of the hylomorphic theory,
cites or comments on the first half

(bl-11) in which the heart is specified as the

organ immediately involved in the movements of anger,

fear,

and reasoning.

6

It is perhaps surprising to find
soning" with emotions
which somehow
(b23);

"reasoning"

in a continuation of this passage,

"possesses" the thinking soul

(408b27);

A.

in which the soul is present
disease, or old age

(b25) whose disturbance by drunkeness,

an interior organ

impairs the rational processes

(b22-25);

I follow the interpretation of Ross

particular internal organ.

upon which memory too is dependent

remember,

love,

etc. to the disability of a

Ross identifies it:

'the brain',

A.

would say 'the heart',

which at this stage

of his thinking he treats as the seat of anger and fear
432b31).

(27-28).

(DA 198-99 ad 408b25) that A. here attributes

the loss of the capacity to reason,

We should say

( 51.avoetaea1.)

linked to a
again links "rea
(love and hate) as dependent upon a certain physical organ

Yet,

change in the heart.

In De Sensu 456a4 and in De Iuv.

ultimate seat-;f all psychical events;

(403a31,

408b8,

478a29 he treats it as the

but it plays a much less prominent

part in De Anima.

If this interpretation is sound,

we have here an important but implicit refer

ence to the heart-sensorium not generally recognized.
50.)

Ross,

realizing its significance,

e.g.,

(See,

Kahn, p. 65, note

quite consistently refuses to include DA I

among the works of A.'s "hylomorphic" period

(PN 16-17; cf. Hardie 66-68).

The connection between the reasoning faculty and the emotions leading to pur
suit or avoidance is taken up again

(as Hicks indicates,

Having introduced the doctrine of the sensus communis
sensorium through which it operates
ing faculty

(426bl6),

274 ad 408b9) in IA III. 7.
(426bl2""f°f.) and the--,,-ultimate"

and having described the image-produc

(427bl2 ff.) and the thinking mind in man

{429al0 ff.),

A.

here returns

to the connection between thought and action and finds them linked through images
produced by the central,
this "ultimate" sense?

the "ultimate" sense

(43lal4-20).

Where is the organ of

A.'s discussion of touch and taste in� II,

again,

commenting on this

(DA 262-63,

265 ad 423al5-16,

said to be "near" or "closely related to" the heart.
in DJuv 469al0-16 where A.

on the ground that
heart,

suggests that A.

has

The full implication appears,

argues to the location of the common sensorium

"we see clearly that two senses,

so that the others must also"

(al2-14).

touch and taste, extend to the

Consequently we should recognize

another implicit reference to the heart in DA II at 423b23 where A.
common sensorium "within".

Ross

where--the conunon organ of touch and taste is

the doctrine of DSen 439al-�in mind,

however,

b23),

makes

422bl7 ff.

it clear that for them it is not the outer flesh but some interior organ.

refers to the

He must have thesame in mind when he speaks of the

"ultimate" organ of sense later in DA III at 426bl6 and 43lal8.

In DA III.7 A. explains that the faculty of pursuit and avoidance, pleasure
and pain, -rs rationally distinct from but really identical with the faculty of sense
perception

(43lal0-14) which also produces the images necessary to and concomitant
Having established this, he
(43lb2-5).

with the operation of the thinking faculty

is ready to discuss the origin of motion in man and animals
ing this problem A.
First,

(432al5 ff.).

In explor

again refers to the heart.

the heart is explicitly mentioned as the physical organ affected by the

image of something painful or pleasant:

"When the mind contemplates some such object,
For example it often thinks

it does not immediately order avoidance or pursuit.
about something frightful or pleasant,
the heart is moved or,

but does not bid one be frightened,

if the object be pleasant,

some other part"

though

(432b29-433al).

The heart, as organ of the central sense and image-making faculty, is the first
organ to react to the image of a pa inful or pleasant object though the mind may nQt

7

sanction its reaction, in which other organs may also be involved.
the psychophysiology suggested here helps to elucidate the cryptic

secondly,

passage toward the .end of this discussion (433bl9-27) where A. speaks of the "bodily
This
pa r t " which the appetitive faculty uses as its organ to move the animal.
organ is found

"at a poi nt where beginning and end coincide."

"For everything is

moved by pushing and pulling, so that something must remain fixed, like the center
Ross, with most conunen
point of a moving circle, from which motion has its origin."
as the heart,
433b26),
ad
question
565
in
Hicks
organ
identifies the
tators (see
"which is for A.

OMA 698bl-4

the central seat of life," and refers the reader to DPA 665al0 and

(DA 317 ad 21-27,

But early in DA itself A.

These passages certainly provide clarification.

25-27).

has already indicated something of the basic dynamics of

emotion and the origin of movement in the heart;

and this will find further elucida

tion at the end of the PN.
As we have seen, � II 420b25-26 indicates that A. is thinking of the heart
11
as the "hottest organ of the body,
the center of vital heat so necessary to nutri
tion and growth.

How this function as center of the thermal system enables the heart

to operate also as center of emotional response and movement is suggested by the
first explicit reference to the heart in the DA,
is bent on establishing that most

psychic

joy,

(403a7) and,

loving and hating"

opposites,

(al?-18).

anger and fear,

again,

ivoAo�,

turns to a favorite pair of

appealing to the common experience that we sometimes feel

these emotions when there is little or no stimulus,
ceived as A6yo�

with the possible

"anger, gentleness, fear, pity, confidence,

To illustrate A.

feel them though the stimulus is great
and material aspect

In the context A.

Examples are 11anger, confidence, desire, and

exception of human thought(403a5-8).
sensation in general"

that at 403a31.

events involve the body,

{bl9-25).

while at other times we do not

Consequently these are to be con

and any adequate definition should include both their formal

(a24ff.).

Taking anger as an example, A. explains that its

formal aspect might be defined as "an urge to inflict pain in retaliation," while
its material aspect would be "a boiling
(a25-31).

(

�&en.<; )

of the blood around the heart"

This suggests that the physical manifestation of anger arises from a more

than normal increase of vital heat

in

the heart,

causing the blood to "boil".

Now anger and fear are linked as opposites in this passage and elsewhere
(DA 403bl8,
1380a33,

408b8;

and cf. DM 453a26-28;

etc.) and have different bodily

DPA 650b27 ff., 667al6-23, 692a22-26;

manifestations

(403al9-26).

reaction is started as an increase of vital heat in the heart, then
reaction begins as a decrease in its normal heat,
where to cool.

Rhet.

If anger

presumably

fear

causing the blood there and else

This ties in precisely with the detailed physiology of De Respiratione

(=D'Jtes) 479bl7-480al6, where A. distinguishes "palpitation" of the heart from "pulsa
tion" :palpitation is a contraction of heat in the heart caused by a cooling down
(479bl9-20);

in a state of fear the body grows cold and the heat, contracted and
sometimes so violently that the organ

concentrated in the heart, makes it palpitate,
ism dies of fright (b21-26).
by heat

Pulsation, the opposite,

�&aa..<;;

an expansion due to an increase

For boiling occurs when liquid is vaporized
)
This must be the "boil
and expands because its bulk increases11 (b30-32).

of hea:t;,\, "is like boiling

(

•

ing" of the blood A. has in mind at DA 403a31 as the physical dimension of anger.
And this contraction and expansion through decrease or increase of the normal temp
erature at the heart accounts for the "pushing and pulling" communicated from the

central organ in A.'s description of the origin of movement at DA 434b25.
mechanics involved see Pseudo-A., Mechanica 847bl6 ff.)
comprehensive description

in�

(For the

It is basic to the more

698al4 ff. and elsewhere.
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Finally, one type of complex animal movement, voice production, is traced
specifically to the region of the heart,

pharynx and lungs in DA II (420b27-33)
has indicated the heart as the "hottest organ of the body"
In discussing sound and voice, A. asserts that nature uses breath in

inunediately after A.

(b25-26).

spired through the pharynx to the lung for two purposes, refrigeration and voice
Refrigeration is needed most at the heart (25-26).
production.
And voice is a
striking of breathed-in air against the windpipe "under the influence of soul in
(b28).
A. explains inunediately what he intends by this last phrase

these parts"

since it constitutes the specific difference of "voice":
duced by an animal is voice

•

•

"For not every sound pro

since it is possible to make a sound just with the

•

tongue or like coughing; but the sound-impact must be ensouled, i.e., its pro
duction accompanied by an act of the image-making faculty.
For voice is the kind

(b29-33: O'Y)µ.av-i;vx�c; 'ljr6cpoc;
)
The "meaning" understood here is of the most elemental type, shared with other animals by man, who
also has the higher power of speech.
"Voice is a sign ( O'Y)µe'tov
) of pain and

.

of sound that conveys meaning"

pleasure,

and for this reason is possessed also by other animals,

for their nature

is developed to this point that they have sensations of pain and pleasure and sig
nal

( O'Y)µ.aCve�v)

then,

these to one another"

(Politics 1253all-14).

clearly implied,

is that the "soul in these parts" functions in sense perception, imagination,

emotion or pleasure-pain reaction, and the communication of emotion through pro
duction of appropriate sound,

implying control of breath and bodily organs.

These

are obviously activities of the "sensitive soul" integrated in the common sensorium,
the heart.

The anatomy, physiology, and teleology of this is detailed in DPA

(664a37 ff., esp.
of voice

665a7-26), while DGA states clearly that the heart is the source

(776bl8) and explains differences in male and female voice quality by rela

tive taughtness or slackness of the heart

(787bl5-788al6).

Thus the explicit and implicit references to the heart in DA, though relatively
few and introduced incidentally,

indicate clearly enough that A.-.ts thinking of the

heart even in this work as the central organ of the nutritive and sensitive life,

a

doctrine he develops explicitly and in detail in the PN and the biological works.
Even in DA II,

where he introduces the definition of

soul

as entelechy of the body,

he also thinks of soul as being present and operating on the nutritive and sensitive
levels "in these parts", i.e.,

in the heart and surrounding organs.

These notions

which to Nuyens and Ross seemed incompatible evidently were not so for A.
What then was the relationship between the two notions for A.?

I believe a

case can be made for the position that A. not only thought of them as compatible but
even as joined by necessity, that his presuppositions about the soul and his concep
tion of soul as described in DA II made it necessary,

in his eyes,

to postulate a

single dominant organ in whic�the soul functions primarily in animals and man.

This is the antithesis of the position of Nuyens.
for the "sensible soul"

(67-68).

Kahn has argued to such a necessity

There seems to be no reason why the same should not

be true for the animal soul as a whole.

�

Necessity of the Heart � Center in Hylomorphism

First let us look at the characteristics of the hylomorphic soul and the con
dition of its existence as A.

preseni> them in the DA.

the value and difficulty of his subject

(402al-403a2)

After a brief introduction on
A. opens the DA with the first

of what Richard Sorabji has called his "two main theoretical statements"

,t

Soul in Ar istotle," Philosophy 49,
examined

1974, 77).

("Body and
This is the passage we have already

(403a3-bl9) in which A. introduces his fundamental position that no function
(with the possible exception of pure thought) exists independently

or affection of soul

9

of a concurrent physical change.

we may distinguish rationally the formal essence

the

from the physical manifestation of anger, for example; but the two are joined in
real event.
The form or essence must be embodied in appropriate matter ( lv lSA.'Q

't"01..q.6t>

(403b2-3); and for the truth both must be taken into account, since emotions
like anger and fear "are inseparable from the animal's physical body in which they
take place" (bl7-18}.
A.'s view from the start is obviously hylomorphic, with
emphasis here on the need for matter, and appropriate matter, if the form is to exist.
to exist

Sorabji locates A.'s second "main theoretical statement" at the end of DA II
"where it rounds off the discussion of the five senses"
better 424al7-bl8).

Here A.

(424b3-18:

Sorabji 77-;-but

is concerned not with perceptive or emotional activities

but with their faculties.
Again he distinguishes rationally the sense faculty from
the sense organ in which it exists.
But in reality "they exist as one and the same
thing,

though they differ in essence.

For that which senses must have extension;

but neither the having power to sense nor the sense faculty is something extended;
they are rather a certain A.6yoc;;
Here
or power of something extended" (424a25-28).
A.

stresses the immateriality of the faculty as form.

But both principles join .to

constitute the living reality and both are equally necessary.

These two passages

catch the basic hylomorphic view of body and soul and should be kept in mind through
the intervening discussion which they frame

(Sorabji 77).

Following the first of these statements at the opening of DA I A. presents a
critical account of earlier theories on soul.

Ross has remarked

(DA 12) that A.'s

own views about the soul "are largely shaped by his sense of the objections to which
earlier views were exposed."

That being the case,

the account of his predecessors

becomes important as an index of the errors A. is trying to avoid and as a formula
tion of the presuppositions which help to shape his own definition and description
of the soul.

Some of A.'s negative reactions to previous theories of soul are as

follows:

1.

Soul is not material,
them:

2.

403b28 ff.;

i.e.

an element like fire or air or any combination of

nor is it a spatial

magnitude

(vs. Plato):

Soul is not joined to body unnaturally or painfully:

407a3-33.

407bl-4;

must be of a special nature so as to join connaturally;

but body and soul

it is absurd to think

any chance soul could be joined to any body;

each body must have form and shape

suitable to the soul it serves as instrument

(vs. Plato ? ,

Pythagorea.ns):

407bl3-25.
3:

On the other hand soul is not simply the harmony,

ing constituents of the body;
to originate motion:

4.

one reason,

or blend of the oppos

is that it has the power

407b26 ff.

Soul does not move body by moving itself;

rather,

is moved only indirectly by reason of the body,
ship:

ratio,

among many,

while not itself moving,

it

its vehicle, like a sailor on a

405b31-407a2, 408a30-33; when soul is said to change, as in emotion, it

is the physical organ

(the peart)

soul but the composite changes;

that changes locally or qualitatively;

not the

movement is from the soul and to the soul;

de

cline of mind in old age is due to deterioration of the interior organ on which
it depends;

5.

soul is not changed,

nor changes itself:

Souls are not all of the same kind,
mals) can originate local motion;
locally;

e•g.

408bl-32.

(Hylomorphism)

not all that have sense perception

(ani

plants have soul but cannot perceive or move

and many animals are without power of reason:

410bl6-27.

10

6.

The soul is not divided into a multipl i city of rea l ly distinct parts each
serving a separ a te function,
motion ,
one:

7.

e.g.

perception and knowing,

or one part thinking,

etc.,

another desiring

appetition,

(Plato?);

local

so the soul is

4lla26-bl4.

Parts of the soul do not hold together parts of the body,

but rather the whole

soul with all its pa rts is present in each part of the bo dy ,
and some insects the whole soul can be divid ed ,

though in plants

since these organisms can be

divided into livin g segments of the same s peci es ;

but they do not survive if

in them the soul does not possess orga ns suitable to preserve their nature:
4llbl5-30.
Some of A.1s presuppositions,
powers,

are that the soul is single with multiple

then,

immaterial but exist i ng only in a co nnatur al material body equipped with

organs suitable to the various functions of soul,
soul,

there being many.

and to this par ticul ar type of

Soul does not change but is the source of change in the

Within the context of these presuppositions A.

ensou l ed organism.

own positive definition of soul

entelechy or actuality, and

ment of the definitio n of soul as the substantia l form,

of a natural body having life potentially

first ac tuality ,

(412al-29).

especially the not io n of sou l as entelech� of the entire body,
attention from Nuyens

(66 ffo;

238 ff.)

and Ross

(DA 10 ff.),

But there is little to be fou nd in the commen t a torS-a nd ,
itself,

underta ke s his

There is no need to rehearse his develop

in DA II.

This aspect,

receives close
and quite properly .

for that matter,

in the DA

about that part of the definition desc rib i ng the kind of body the soul can

inform and activate.

It is identified first as "a natural body having life potentia l ly "

(412a28).

A.innnediately specifies this as "a natu ral body equipped with organs," and hastens
to point out that the definition applies to plants since they also have organs.
contrast to an artifact,

kind,

e.g.

one having in itself a pr inci p l e or source

viz.

(412bl6-17;

cf.

Physics 192b4-23).

of soul in plants,

animals, and man,

Later ,

•

.

•

( d.pxfl

) of its motion or rest"

after distinguishing the vario u s powers

reinfor ces the point that each kind of soul

A.

can exist only in a body proper to it,
only be rea li z ed

In

it must be "a natural body of a particular

an axe,

since

"

the ac tua l i t y of any given thing can

in a matter of its own appropriate to it li

(414a25-27).

But A.

has not much more to say directly about the body beyond these generalizations in.DA.
Nor should we expect him to go beyond this in a work on the soul, though we have
seen in his incidental references to t he heart in DA that he thinks of the heart as
But A. could not properly dis
the central organ, in man and other blooded animals.
or the bodily structure demanded by any soul,
until he had first presented a more c omprehensive account of the varieties and
f unctions of soul, the soul as efficient and final as well as formal cause of the

cuss the appropriateness of thi s body,

organism ,

the soul ' s nutritive,

and their objects,

sensitive,

locomotive,

and inte llectua l faculties

which is what he doe s in the remainder of DA,

do thr ough the ear l y treatises of the PN,

as

and continues to

Kahn has shown.

We must turn then to other works which obviously share with
view of soul.

Bo th Nuyens

(e.g.

176-77)

and Ross

�

the hylomorphic

(DA 11) regard the Metaphysics as

There the n;;; familiar passage at Zeta
1035bl4 f f. is instructive.
Discussing the relation of parts to the whole, A. des
cribes soul in hylomorphic terms as the "form or essence of a body of a certain

closely related to DA in this respect.

kind"

(bl6)

and explains that the soul and its parts,

prior to the animal and to the body and its parts;

as essential substance,

are

though in a sense they are not,

since they cannot exist apart from the concr e t e whole,

the composite of body and soul.
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of the relationship of parts of t he composite to the whole, he goes
without qualification: "Some p arts are neither prior nor po ste ri o r to
the composite, namely
those which are controlling (xop1.a ) and in which the formula,
i.;·• the essential substance (o X6yo� xat � o &a� a } is primari l y present (iv
nP<AYt'Ct> )
e.g., the heart, or perhaps the brain,-- for it does n ot matter which of t he
two is of such a natu re" (b25-28}.
Thr:!n,

speaking

on to remark

,

;

,

Here, as has been re.m ark e d, A. speak� of the h ylomorphi c soul as be i ng "present
in" some particular controlling organ (at t h e moment he is not interested in taking
sides on whether this be heart or brain; see below) .
The soul is present in this
controlling organ primarily.
And the organ is one that is not prior or po st erior to
the composite but comes into exi s te nc e simultaneously ( �µ.a) with it.
T he con text
of A.'s th oug h t is cla ri f ied by a related passage in M Delta where, in lis ti ng
various mea nin gs of th e word apxfl ( source, beginning) -he mentions in third place
"that thing as a result of whose presence something first comes into being, e.g., as
the keel is the beginning of a ship, the foundation the begi nning of a house, and in
the case of animals some say the heart, others the brain, others something similar
(1013a4-6).
•

•

• "

Though these passages do n ot commit A. t o either the heart or th e brain, they
certainly make it clear that he conce ives the hylomorphic s oul as present in, form
in g and informing, some one principal or controlling organ first in the generation
of the an ima l
And the moment that organ is formed marks the begin ning of t he ani
mal, the composite.
For the rest of the animal is formed from this organ and around
it as its beginning and source.
.

The necessity,

as we l l

as the dynamics, of this process is br ought out force
as hylemorphique (256-263}.
The h yl om orp hic
soul of DA ca nn o t exist except as formal cause i nf ormi ng a n ap prop riate organ or
s y ste m o�organs; it is also the effic i e nt cause, the source of cha ng e and motion,
which forms apd functions in the composite; and it is the final cause for the sak e
of whose functions the complete organism, the End, is developed and maintained.
Accordingly, in DGA 735b34 ff. A. explains that to i nit iat e t he i ndepe ndent life of
a n ew animal theSoul must form a single primary organ from the residue of seed, which
f ul ly in DGA,

a

work which Nuyens regards

ensouled organ becomes the source of all other organs subsequently formed
"First of all it is necessary

of motion is present

(ttvayxa'tov )

that some part exist in which the source

(since of course this is a part of the End,

iv xat xup1,.&,;a�ov

(742a33-b3):

being single and

) ; and then after this the whole organism, i.e.,
th e End
So that if th ere is some such pa rt -- which must (ttvayxatov) be present
in animals, one which possesses the pr inc iple (apx�) and the End of th e animal's
whole nature
it is necessa ry (ttvayxa!ov ) that this be formed f irst ( np(;yc-o v ) �
inst rumen t of change (x1.vT)'t"1.x6v} but simultaneously with the whole organism�
part of the End."
all-controlling,
•

•

.

--

The implications are no doubt clear.

The soul must form, inform and activate
by means of which it produces the natural
growth of the other organs necessary for the functioning of all its powers or facul
ties .
This organ is not only chronologically first in generation but also the domi
nant or controlling orga n in the fully-formed animal, since it must continue to do its
work as primary control center of the life processes if the organism is to continue
to b e nourished, refreshed by sleep, etc. so as to maintain itself.
Hence the soul
is p res e nt in this organ p rimar ily and as controlling the other organs through it.
This is not to deny that the soul also forms, informs and activates
and so is
present in -- the other organs necessary to all its functions.
But it can do this
a single cont roll i ng organ from the start,
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only because it is present first in one organ formed to serve as origin and control
center ( dpxTi> of the other organs.
Thus soul is present in all the organs of the
body,
organ

but not in the same way.

n� xat xop�OO<;.

It must be,

and continue to be,

Yet this organ,

like any other,

present in one

lives and functions

only as part of a living whole.
Perhaps it is this A. has in mind at DA II 412bl6l 7 where he de�cribes the body appropriate for the hylomorphic soul as-;;-a natural
body of a particular kind,
of its motion and rest."
motion and rest;

viz. one having in itself a principle or source

Of course the soul must always be the ultimate source of

DGA leaves no doubt about which organ this is
(vs.

dpxfi>,

(

74lbl6-17):

tive and formative

•

•

•

A.

"

estab

(see 740b30-74la3) processes;

analogous to the heart.

(blood) is

it is the center of vital heat necessary for the nutri
it is located in the place of com
In lower animals it is an organ

mand at the geometrical center of the organism.

&pxfi

"The first to

The heart is observed to be the first formed in the

it is the center of the vascular system from which nourishment

pumped to the other organs;

as an

(e.g.

which in blooded animals is the heart

those who favor the brain) as the primary organ on the basis

of several considerations:
embryo;

apxfi )

but it can only exist as incorporated in an appropriate organ.

be formed is the source
lishes the heart

(

And even plants grow out symmetrically from some part formed

{DGA 762bl8-21).

We have been concerned with the processes of formation,
--all functions of the "nutritive soul" which,
a primary organ,

the heart,

nutrition,

as we have seen,

and growth,

necessarily informs

as source and control center of these processes in the

developing and in the mature animal.

But the distinguishing characteristic of an

animal is the presence of a "sensitive soul".
"nutritive soul" and the heart?

What necessity connects this with the

DGA is of little help here.

As we

have seen, the question of the distinction between the nutritive, sensi
"parts" of soul was settled at the end of DA I in favor of one soul
with a number of rationally, not really, distinct facultieS:- The question arises
tive,

and o t her

again in DA II
conclusion:

(413bl3-32) and at the end of DA III

Aside from pure intellect,

"the

separable in the way that some allege them to be;
they are logically distinct"
soul is aimed,

(432a22 ff.) and reaches the same

remaining

parts of the soul.

•

•

are not

at the same time it is clear that

(413b27�29).

here as elsewhere,

The statement asserting the real unity of
'
at the Platonic view of Timaeus 69 D ff. which

divides the soul into three really distinct parts and assignes each to a particular
area of the body

(Hicks 327 ad 413b28).

and several implicit,

We have also seen that three of the explicit,

refereru;-es to the heart in DA show that A.

the organ of the central sense power;

is thinking of it as

while the fourth explicit reference points to

the heart as center of the vital heat operative in nutrition and growth.

Thus in the

DA, though concerned with the formal and avoiding the material aspect of the organism,
A. indicates incidentally that he is thinking of the single animal soul as embodied
in a unified physiological system centered in the heart.

This becomes explicit in the

PN.
Kahn has established by careful analysis of A.'s theory of sensation in DA and

the first three treatises of the PN that "the De Anima and the Parva Naturaliaform
a continuous and progressive exposition• (67) in which investigation of the indivi
dual senses gives way to "ingressive exploration" of the sensus conununis until, in

his explanation of sleep, "Aristotle's psychology meets his physiology" (59), i.e.
the "unity of the entire sense faculty" is in De Somno (455al2-22) "for the first
time linked to the physiological doctrine of the unity of the sense apparatus in the
conunon sensorium, the heart
" (ibid.).
Later, rounding off this subject, Kahn
•

•

•
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concludes that there is a necessary connection between A.'s sense psychology and
his physiology

(68) :

For the sensory soul is, by definition, the form and realization of the
sensory body; and the unity of one is unthinkable without the unity of
Far from contradicting the psychologica·1 doctrine of the De

t:he other.
Anima,

the physiology of the Parva Naturalia and of the biological works

is required if the doctrine of sense perception as a single faculty of
The inference from unity of

the soul is to be understood at all.

faculty to unity of physiological system is explicitly made by Aristotle
himself in the Parts of Animals

(667b21-31),

where the fact that

animals possess a sensory soul which is actually one'

'all

is cited as a

causal explanation for the unity of the vascular system in the heart.
The conclusion is,

I believe,

inescapable.

validly extended to the whole animal soul,
"sensory soul",

as is A.

to showing that A.

Kahn is concerned specifically with the

in the passage cited from DPA.

was himself aware of

systein to serve the single animal soul.
As Kahn points out,

But though the principle may be

�

necess

i�of

Moreover,

we are conunitted

a unified physiological

for the first time in the continuous discussion beginn

ing with DA "Aristotle's psychology meets his physiology" explicitly in the DSom

455al2-22-;here the common sensorium is identified as the heart.

it."'"i'S

However,

essential to A.'s explanation of the phenomenon of sleep and waking that he also
identify the heart here as center of the nutritive functions.

For what specifies

the "incapacity of the sense faculty" in sleep is that it is caused by thermal
changes in the heart,

center of the vital heat and of the vascular system.

these thermal changes are induced by the ingestion of food

(456a30 ff.).

And

Thus the

functions of the "nutritive soul" closely affect those of the "sensitive soul" be
cause both nutritive and sensory systems are united.in their common central organ,
the heart.
A. identifies the heart, then, as center of both systems in DSom;

but he does

not use the vocabulary of necessity which would reveal his conviction that the ani
mal soul must be actualized in a body unified by the heart.

This is reserved until

he has completed his discussion of the "sensitive soul" and allied subjects in the
first five treatises of the PN and has returned to consideration of topics related
to the "nutritive soul" in the last three.
These are so closely related that they constitute a continuous discussion
Loeb 388).
life,

(Hett,

The first treatise introduces the subject of the length and shortness of

describing the ultimate physical constituents of various organisms and their

role in determining the life-span of each.
detail the subjects of youth,
(467bl0-13).

old age,

Following this,

death,

A.

plans to explore in

and the related topic of respiration

In preparation he discusses explicitly the relation of the "parts" of

the animal soul to each other and to the body,

referring to his treatment of soul

in DA and connecting the notion of soul developed there with a body unified through
a central controlling organ

(467bl3-16) :

"Since we have discussed the soul in precise

detail in another treatise and it is clear that.its essential nature cannot be corporal,
nevertheless it is also evident that soul is present in some particular bodily part,
and this one of the parts having control over the rest."
We have seen A.

use the language of necessity in DGA in connecting the opera-
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Here he emplo ys it again

tion of the "nutritive soul " to a single p rima ry organ.
to

establish the unity of the nut ritiv e and sensitive soul in a co nt roll in g organ

(bl8-23):
Rega rding things that are said to be 'animals' and
those org an i sms to which both these terms a pply

it is n e cessa ry

to be 'alive',--in

to be an animal and

(viz.

Cdvayx�

) that there be a single identical
part in virtue of which the o rganism both 'lives' and is called an 'ani 
Fo r it is imposs i bl e for an 'an imal' qua 'animal' not to be al ive
mal'.
to be alive)

An o rgani sm endowed with an animal

powe rs of the

•

•

•

"

( "sens itive" ) soul must always possess the
And
(DA 4 14 b28-4 15 a 2) .

"nutritive" soul in virtue of which it lives

the single soul w ith both nutritive and sensitive powers must operate through a
single controlling organ.

This o rgan,

to be a suitable instrument for such a soul,

"mt1st be numerically one and the same but have multiple and different modes of being,
since to be 'animal ' and to be 'alive' are not identical"
A.

Proc e e ds next

basis that

(b27 ff.)

the organ of

(1)

to establish that this organ is the hea rt,

on the

the sensus communis and the source of the n ut ritive

faculty would occupy a central position in the body;
be formed first in the

(467b25-27).

the heart is obs e rved to

(2)

(3) the heart is the so urce of the blood vessels
which carry nourishment (blood) to the rest of the body.
"Th er efore it is necessary

Cdvayx�

embryo;

) that in blooded an ima ls the source and con trol

•sensitive'

and the

' n utr i t i ve' soul be in the heart"

center Capxfl)

(469a5-7) .

of both th e

The concl usion is

further reinforced by observation that the centr a l sense is lo c ated in the heart
since the basic senses of touch and taste are traced to that organ

(469al0-16):

and

by deduction from the principl e that nat ure alwa ys works to ach i eve the best possi
ble,

and the c ent r a l pos itio n is the be�t for contro l

argument with the sta te ment

possession of a

(469b3-6):

'sensitive soul',

(

d.pxf))

What is the nature of the "ne c es sity" which A.
Probably that which he expl ains in a nother context
in its conditional sense,

its own proper nature,
are

to belong to it,

clo ses the

( &.vayxa!ov

)

in the h eart ."
has

in mind in these sta temen t s ?

(DSom 455b26-28):

"I use the term

mean ing that if an animal is to exist and have

by necessit y ce rtai n things must belong to

it;

and if these

c erta in others must also belong to it."

Following this direction,
as follows:

A.

in blooded an imals it is n e c essar y

that this have its sou rc e and control center

' n e c ess ity '

(a28-bl).

"Since th eref ore an animal is defined by the

we might suppose his r e asoni ng would proceed somewhat

If the hylomorp hic animal soul,

being one with seye ral faculties,

is to

it must be real ize d in an appropriate body.
But this mu s t be a "body equip
ped with organs" in s uch a way that thP. one soul can carry on its complex functions
But this can only be done through a complex
in a unified and coo rdin a te d manner.
ex i s t,

system of approp ri ate organs unified under a s i ngle central

and controlling organ

through which the soul can operate as source of motion and rest in t he entire organ
ism,

integ ra ting and controlling the life functions on both the nutritive and sensi

tive levels .

But in blood ed animals this must be the central and controlling organ

of the vasc u l ar system and the sensory system , the h ea rt .
The best constructed anima l s ,
far as possible,

one.

A.

remark s

(468bll-13),

Paul Siwek has seen that,

have a nature that is,

Aristotle's hylomorphic so ul can only incorporate its unity by forming,

a body integrated about a single c ontrolling organ
un it as entis vivi potest salvari."

as

unlike Plato's tripartitie soul ,
(op.

ci t.

and informing,

19): "Tune solummo do

The same po int was made several centuries ago by
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,Jacoh Zaharella in his commen ta ry on
an im ali s

Ad u n i tat e m vero

II

DA

{cap.

II,

295

D) :

servandam unum tan tum praecipuum membrum

in quo tota sit anima radicata et a quo tamquam

est concedendum,

princ ip io et fonte ad 0IT1nes corpo r i s partes effundatur

.

•

•

Soul in the Heart and in the Body as a Whole
----------------In the l ig ht of these considerations,

that the soul

"is present in

how are we to deal with A.'s statements

) some particular part of the body"

e!va.1. lv

(

(�

467

bl5), tha:t: some part of the body "possesses" the sensitive soul ( [xe1. a.o-rl)v : DMem
450a29)' that the apxfl of the se ns i tive and nutritive soul is "in the heart" ( ev -qi

xa.pqt<(

How can A.

DJuv 469a6-7)?

:

the soul as form or entelechy,
This

is obviously the problem which led Nuyens to declare the "entelechy view"

incompatible with

the "heart view" and

discussing sensation only,
soul.

•

speak in these terms and at the same time conceive

the principle of life throughout the body?

to propose

includes not only the general power of sensation but also the special faculties

•

of external sense,

it must be thought of

though it does so from

as inform i ng the entire sense apparatus,

its source or foundation

a derivative psychic power residentin the eye •

cou ld apply to

ing the entire

the an imal as a whole,

the body,

in -the heart.
-

al

Thus there is

• • "

i.e.

in f orm 

all the organs of the body,

The psychic power informing and

in that

it originated

but

maintaining the other organs

genetically in the heart,

and preserves them in dependence on the heart,
from its center

The soul must be thoughtof as

source or foundation in the primary and first-formed organ of

the heart.

is derivative

thus:

nutritive and sensory apparatus,

�o fro m its

as doing

( arch@ )

statement were broadened to include the whole nutritive-sensory soul

Tf Kahn's
it

Kahn,
his chronological solution.
approach (69): "Since the sensory

suggests a more promising

formed the other organs

imp arts change and movement to them

in the heart.

To say that the sou l has its source in the heart i s · not to deny its presence in
the rest of the body, but only to affirm that it is present in a different way in
For the soul forms and act iv ates the heart as
the heart and in the ot her organs.
the primary and controlling organ of the body, and so is presen t in the heart in a
way different

from it s Dresence

in the heart

organic

systems

cult
s tand

statements

abl e .

-

in all

s e c ondary

and subordinate organs,

i.e.�it is

the control

center of all functions carried out through the
Co nceiv e d in this way, some of f\.1s diffi
that constitute the body.
about the presence of the soul "in the heart" are more easily und er

present

as

find a contradiction between the notion of soul as form or en
of the whole body and soul as being present "in the heart" because they evi
dently understand the latter expression to imply local presence in t he strict sense.
Nuyens and Ross

telechy

Thus Nuyen s interprets t he phrase as equivalent to "localis � e

a

une place definie"

Understood
(PN 12; DA 10).
in this way, the soul would "be located in" the heart as--;ine isin a jar, to use A.1s
and Ross takes it as meaning

(259);

example

(Physics 210a24 ff.).

This,

"being located
of course,

in"

would certainly preclude its being

present in the same way at the same time in the rest of the body.
However,

as Sorab j i points out

requirements for

'

being in a place'."

(85, note 62'), "the soul does not meet Aristotle1s
(Cf.

DA 406al2-16 and Physics 210b32 ff.)

To
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A.

"being in place" implies matter and extension,

The soul,

therefore,

being incorporeal,

as does moving from place to Ple1.ce.

can no more "be in place",

of itself, than it
can hardly h�ve intended, then, that
the irnmr.tterial soul be understood to be "in the heart" locally.
He must have in mind
some other mode of "b e ing in" that organ.

can

move locally,

of itsAlf (DA 405b32 ff.}.

A.

As a preliminary ro his c:Uscussion of space in the Physics, A. enumer a t e s eight
different senses in which one thing is said to "be in" another (210al4-24}.
The last,
signifying localization in the strict sense, is inapplicable to soul and heart, as
are the first four, which involve the relationship of part to whole and genus to
species.

is said to

The fifth concerns the relationship between form and matter, since the form
"be in" the matter of the compound.
Perhaps A. speaks of the soul "in the

heart" in this sense.

A. certainly affirms that the soul is "in" a body as its form or entelechy.
He,
agrees with those who think that the soul cannot ex'I'S't'""without a body, though itself
not body:
"For it is not a body, but something belonging to a body, and for this
reason is present in a body"

Clv o&>µa't't. unapx&1.: DA

414a21-23}.

to insist that this must be "a body of a particular kind;

decessors supposed,
kind of body,

But then A.

goes on

not at all as our pre

who fitted it to any body without specifying in which or what

though obviously one chance thing does not receive another"

(a23-25).

The actuality or soul of each organism comes to exist only in what is potentially
such by nature,

i.e.

in its own proper matter.

We have seen that for A.
soul of a blooded animal

the matter necessary and proper for activation by the

(including man}

one primary and controlling organ,

is a body generated from and integrated by
Clearly the animal and human soul

the heart.

can properly be said to "be in" the whole of such a body as form in its proper matter.
But could it also be said to "be in" the heart in this sense?

Certainly not if this

is understood in an exclusive sense to mean that the soul is present "in the heart"

For they also must be in

as form in its proper matter but not in the other organs.
formed and activated by soul to be alive;
of a living whole,

as A.

insists.

and a heart is not a heart except as part

But is there a sense in which the soul can be

said to be in the heart as form in its proper matter without excluding its presence
in the other organs?
Discussing the notion of cause in

t!_

Delta 1013a24 ff.,

A. remarks that "ca11ses

and even of those which are of the same kind some are

are spoken of in may senses,

causes in a prior and some in a posterior sense"

(1013b31-32).

Later,

the material cause of generable natural substances and events in M Eta
he maintains that we must state not only all the causes
but the most proximate

final)
of man,

sleep,

The whole animal,

he agrees,

is certainly affected.

But with respect to

or some other part"

introduced here for pacific reasons.}

what particular affection of that part,
kind of immobility,

what is the proximate material affected

His answer is "the heart,

(The "other part" can be disregarded,

efficient,

Turning to the example of

but that which is proper or peculiar to his form.

and of what proximately?

(1044al5 ff.},

formal,

i.e. not fire or earth as the material cause

he asks what is its proper material,

(blS-20).
what,

(1044b2),

-;-

(material

discussing

induced in that part

and not of the whole animal?
(the heart},

(bl8).

And

It is a special

the proximate subject.

(A.

assumes the psychophysiology of sleep explained in DSom 456a30 ff.)
The distinction introduced here between the heart and the whole animal as prox
imate and secondary material cause may be important.
the primary or proximate subject of sleep A.

While designating the heart as

does not deny,

that the whole animal is the subject of sleep.

but specifically affirms,

But the whole animal sleeps because
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of a specific affection or inunobility in the controlling organ.
proximate material subject of sleep is the heart;

The proper and

the whole animal is the proper but

secondary subject of that affection.

It is possible,

then,

that when A.

speaks of the soul "in the heart• he has in

mind the heart as primary and proximate material organ of the soul,
organ originally informed and activated by the soul,

depend for their formation and activation by the soul.
formed and activated by the soul,

the controlling

upon which all other organs
They too live�

i.e.,

are in

but in a way which is secondary and more remote.

To speak of the soul as existing "in the heart",

then,

is not to deny its presence

in the other organs but only to indicate the primary and proximate subject it informs
and activates.
A.

A heart would be no heart if not part of a living whole.

uses another difficult phrase when he speaks of a certain part of the body

that "possesses" the sensitive soul

lv •

(

• •

�

µop t<e•

• •

!xov-r1. athf}v: �em

This suggests an exlusive possession incompatible with hylomorphism.

450a29)

•

And it is in

compatible if understood in the sense that a part of the body "possesses" or "holds"
the sensitive soul "as the container holds the contained."
of the verb "to possess,

to hold"

(

�x�a.v)

This is the third sense

distinguished by A.

and illustrated by the example "as the jar hold s the liquid"

in M Delta l023a8-25

(alS-16).

Obviously

this sense brings us back to that strict localization in space which for A.
applicable to the immaterial soul.
probably the second,

is in

He must be using the verb in another sense,

which he explains thus:

(al2-13): "We say something �possesses'

or 'holds' another when the other is present in it as in receptive material,
the bronze 'possesses' or 'holds'
part of the body

(the heart)

"possesses" its form.

the shape of the statue."

e.g.

as

In this sense a certain

would "possess" the sensitive soul as the material organ

As we have seen,

"possess" the sensitive soul,

this need not imply that other organs do not

but only that the one organ,

the heart,

"possesses" it

primarily as proximate material causeo
What of the troublesome passage at the end of DMA 703a28 ff.?

There A.,

describing the psychophysiology of the origin of motion in the heart,
animal organism to a well governed city-state where,
set up,

once a constitutional order is

there is no need for several separate monarchs to preside over various areas

of operation,

since each individual performs his function as ordered under a single

source of conunand.

The same,

natural growth and structure,
tion,

after

compares the

he says,

comes about in the animal organism through

each part formed by nature to fulfill its proper func

.f.

so that -- and here is the difficult sta ement

need for soul to be in each part
in some center of control
over the body,
1014b20-23)

(

c_lv ex&.O"r<t> &1.va1.),

ttpxTJ !_or

(703a36-b2)

--

"there is no

but with the soul being present

'central origin of authority',

the other parts live by organic unity with it

(

Peck,

Loeb 477/)

npoon&�ox&va1.

:

cf.

M

and perform their own functions through their natural formation."

It seems clear from the nature of the treatise and the inunediate context that
A.

is thinking here of the soul not as formal but as efficient cause,

and is de

scribing particularly how and where the soul initiates movement or change in the ani
mal body so as to control its functions and locomotion.

He is insisting that under

this aspect the soul occupies and operates from only� control center,

the heart.

This is a brief echoe of a point he makes constantly and at length in DPA,
that one source and center of control is best
that this is the heart,
mand

(665al0-13;

which occupies the center,

665bl8-21).

unity of the animal soul.

L." ..

?),

-

Ultimately,

(

n�)

665bl4-16;

namely,

666al4) and

the place of leadership and com

as we have seen,

"The sensory soul is,

fore the part which primarily

i

(657b20-21;

A.

links this with the

in all animals,

one actually;

possesses this soul is also one

•

•

•

"

there

(667b23-

18

.

\

imp
.
1ying
. \
it, but in a s econdary mode, i.e. not as contro l
centers but as contro ll ed .
The soul �originating change and controlling the �
functions is present in the heart in a way in which it is not present in other organs.
24 )

•

Here A.

the hear t as possessing t h e sou 1 pr1mar1
.
.
ch aract er1zes
·1 y,

that the other organs possess

Aristotle apparently makes this point against other thinkers (Plato?) who pos
tulate more than one control center in the animal.
At nPA 665b27-29 he criticizes
certain persons who claim that the so urce of the blood-vessels is in the head, on
the grou nd that "first of all they set up many control centers (<l.pxat ) scattered
about."
He may have these in mind in DMA 703a31-33: There is no more need for sep
arate control centers in diff er ent parts of the animal orga n i sm than there is for
sepa rate monarchs to occupy and over se e different s ec tions of a well organized city
state .
In the animal or g a ni sm, as in the body po liti c, one center of control is
best.

said to "be in" another, listed at Physics
"As the affairs of the Hellenes
way thus:
are said to 'be in' the king and, in general, as something is said to 'be in' the
primary agent of mo tion or change" ( lv � n� x�vT}'C'�lUt>: 210a21-22). This may be
the meaning A. has in mind with regard to the soul andthe heart at DMA 403a37: As
'
the "affairs of the Hellenes " are in the whole social organism so the animal soul
is in the whole animal org ani sm. But as the affairs of the Hel l enes are "in the
king" in a special way so the animal soul is present "in the heart" alone in the
same sp e cial way, i.e. as in the primary source of change and control.
Among the

210al4 ff.,

A.

various

ways one thing is

distinguishes the sixth

